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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JAMES SANDS, et al., j
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, )
)
V . '
)
MORONGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., )
Defendants and Respondents. )
)
)
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court of the 
State of California, County of San Bernardino 
The Honorable LeRoy A. Simmons, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division Two
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 2, 1986, taxpayers James Sands and Jean Bertolette 
("Petitioners") filed a complaint and motion for preliminary 
injunction against the Morongo Unified School District 
("District" ) in the Superior Court for the County of San 
Bernardino. (C.T. 1.) The complaint seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief to restrain the District from including 
invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies, based on 
alleged violations of the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and article I, section 4; article XVI, section 5, 
and article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution. (C.T.
7. )
The court denied Petitioners’ request for preliminary
1
injunction in an order issued June 24, 1986. (C.T. 10*11.) Both
parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment, 
Petitioners on August 26, 1987, and Respondents on September 22, 
1987. (C.T. 19, 99.) On December 3, 1987, the court granted
Petitioners* motion for summary judgment and by the same order 
denied the District’s motion for summary judgment. (C.T. 177.)
The District appealed to California’s Fourth District Court 
of Appeal, and on September 19, 1989, that court reversed. Sands 
V. Morongo Unified School Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 45 (1989). The 
court’s ruling allows the District to continue its practice of 
including invocations and benedictions at the graduation 
ceremonies. This court granted Petitioners’ petition for review 
on December 7, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Morongo Unified School District operates four high 
schools in San Bernardino County. (C.T. 24.) Traditionally, 
invocations and benedictions are included at the high schools 
graduation ceremonies. (C.T. 25.) This tradition dates back 
twenty-two years at Yucca Valley High School (’’Yucca Valley”) and 
more than fifty years at Twenty-Nine Palms High School ( Twenty- 
Nine Palms"). (C.T. 106.) Sky and Monument High Schools ("Sky" 
and "Monument") have included invocations and benedictions in 
their graduation ceremonies since 1977 and 1978, respectively. 
(C.T. 160.)
The invocations and benedictions comprise a fraction of the 
entire graduation ceremonies. Generally, the invocations and
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benedictions last only thirty to sixty seconds each (C.T. 108), 
while an entire ceremony lasts from forty-five to ninety minutes. 
(C.T. 107.) At Yucca Valley and Twenty-Nine Palms, the 
graduation ceremonies have in the past included the following 
stages: a) a processional; b) a presentation of colors; c) the
pledge of allegiance; d) the national anthem; e) the invocation; 
f) a welcome by the class president; g) two senior student 
speakers; h) a musical selection; i) another student speaker; j) 
two salutary addresses by students; k) another musical selection; 
1) a student singer; m) the valedictorian address; n) the 
presentation of the honor student; o) the presentation of the 
senior class; p) the acceptance of the senior class; q) the roll 
call and presentation of diplomas; r) a musical selection by a 
choir; s) another student singer; t) the benediction, and u) a
recessional. (C.T. 26-27. )
The ceremonies take place after school hours (C.T. 162) on 
the high schools* grounds. Sands, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 50 51.
For example, the 1986 graduation ceremony at Yucca Valley was 
held on the football field. (C.T. 71.) Generally, only 
graduating seniors and their immediate families attend. (C.T. 
158.) Attendance by the graduates is voluntary and is not a 
prerequisite for graduating. (C.T. 161.) Participants have 
technically graduated prior to the event. (C.T. 162.)
At Yucca Valley, the senior class president selects all 
graduation speakers with the assistance of the vice principa 
(C.T. 162.) The principal at Yucca Valley has the right of final
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selection of the speakers. (C.T. 107.) However, school 
officials have never taken an active role in determining who 
speaks at the Yucca Valley graduations, with the exception of the 
1986 ceremony. (C.T. 164.) That year, the District 
Superintendent of Schools, Joseph Boeckx, requested that Mark 
Weisberg, Yucca Valley’s vice principal, "[keep] the graduation 
program in line with past graduations" and include a clergy 
person. (C.T. 169.) This involvement was strictly in response 
to the inception of this litigation. (C.T. 164.) Mr. Boeckx’s 
request was communicated to the senior class president, who then 
made the final selections of Pastor Kimball to deliver the 
invocation (C.T. 68) and a teacher to present the benediction. 
Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d at 51.
Speakers selected in the past to deliver the invocations and 
benedictions have included both lay and clergy persons. (C.T. 
162.) In 1985, the year preceding commencement of this action, a 
youth pastor at the Evangelical Free Church delivered the 
invocation at Yucca Valley’s graduation ceremony (C.T. 162) and 
an employee of the School District presented the benediction. 
(C.T. 162.)
Twenty-Nine Palms’ senior class president and student body 
representatives have final selection authority over who speaks at 
their graduation. (C.T. 107.) In 1985, they selected a 
Presbyterian minister to present the invocation and a Catholic 
priest to deliver the benediction. (C.T. 107.) The record does 
not indicate how graduation speakers are selected at Monument and
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Sky. However, Protestant ministers delivered the invocations and 
benedictions at both schools in 1985. gaqds, 214 Cal. App. 3d at
51.
In 1986, Yucca Valley’s vice principal requested that the 
speakers keep the language of the invocations and benedictions as 
secular and nonsectarian as possible. (C.T. 127-28.) In 
compliance with this request, the speakers made references only 
to "heavenly father" and "lord" in the invocation, and "father" 
in the benediction. (C.T. 94-95.) Neither speaker referenced a 
specific deity. (C.T. 94-95.) The only language with which 
Petitioners take issue appears in those invocations and 
benedictions. Sands, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 50 n.2, 51 n.3.
There are no calculable expenses specifically attributable 
to the inclusion of invocations and benedictions in the high 
school graduation ceremonies. (C.T. 162.) All speakers at the 
ceremonies, whether employees of the District, clergy, or 
students, participate as volunteers and are not compensated out 
of district funds. (C.T. 162.) Funds budgeted by the District 
for graduation ceremonies are expended for cap and gown rental 
(C.T. 131), printing of programs, and security. (C.T. 171.)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is the practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution?
2. Is the practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies 
constitutional under the Establishment and No Preference Clauses 
of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution?
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3 Is the practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies 
constitutional under article XVI, section 5 of the California 
Constitution, which restricts state aid for religious purposes.
4. Is the practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies 
constitutional under article IX, section 8 of the California 
Constitution, which restricts teaching of sectarian doctrine in
public schools?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court should uphold the decision of the court of appeal. 
The District’s practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the United 
States Constitution. The Supreme Court has not specifically 
decided the constitutionality of invocations and benedictions at 
public high school graduation ceremonies. It has, however, 
applied the test developed in T.emon v. Kurtzm^, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971), to many cases requiring an Establishment Clause analysis. 
Under Lemon, a practice must: 1) have a secular, rather than
religious purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; and 3) not lead to excessive governmental
involvement. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
The District’s invocations and benedictions serve a 
sufficiently secular purpose under the first prong of Lemon when 
examined in the context of the high school graduation ceremonies. 
Exclusive focus by a court on the religious nature of a practice 
without analyzing its context is clear error. Lynch v_. Donnelly 
465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). When viewed in the context of the
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secular graduation ceremonies, the District’s practice of 
including brief invocations and benedictions is constitutional.
The District’s practice is constitutional under the second 
prong of Lemon as well because the practice does not have the 
effect of endorsing religion and any promotional effect it has on 
religion is at most incidental, remote, and indirect. "[W]here 
the government’s act of recognition or accommodation is passive 
and symbolic, any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to 
present a realistic risk of establishment." County of Allegheny 
V. ACLU. 492 U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3092 (1989).
The District’s practice is also permissible under the third 
prong of the Lemon test because it does not involve supervision 
or funding of the type sufficient to constitute excessive 
entanglement with any religious institution. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
621. Thus, the District’s practice of including invocations and 
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies passes all 
three prongs of the Lemon test and is therefore constitutional 
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Lemon test is not the only analysis the Court employs to 
determine the constitutionality of practices challenged under the 
Establishment Clause. The District’s practice is more 
appropriately scrutinized under the historical analysis set forth 
in Marsh v. Chambers. 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court found 
that invocations in legislative settings serve a permissible 
ceremonial function. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch _y_^ 
Donnelly, which likened the legitimate secular purpose of
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legislative invocations to courtroom invocations, suggests that 
the Marsh decision may be interpreted to validate invocations in 
general. Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The District recognizes that the courts are particularly 
vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause 
in the school setting. However, the Court distinguishes official 
school prayers from permissible "patriotic or ceremonial" 
practices in which school children are officially encouraged to 
participate. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
The District’s practice has none of the repetitive and 
indoctrinational qualities which characterize school prayers 
promulgated in state statutes or policies. The District’s 
practice of including invocations and benedictions in its high 
school graduation ceremonies serves a legitimate ceremonial 
function and is therefore constitutional under the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution.
The District’s inclusion of brief invocations and 
benedictions withstands analysis under the relevant provisions of 
the California Constitution. The practice is permissible under 
the Establishment and No Preference Clauses of article I, section 
4 of the California Constitution. Because there are few 
California cases addressing the California Constitution s 
Establishment Clause in detail, it is appropriate for the court 
to apply the analysis used by federal courts in addressing the 
United States Constitution’s Establishment Clause. Our analysis 
demonstrating that the District’s practice is valid under the
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federal Establishment Clause shows that the District’s practice 
is permissible under the California Constitution’s Establishment 
Clause as well.
Likewise, the District’s practice is permissible under the 
California Constitution’s No Preference Clause when analyzed 
according to the preference test developed in Fox v. City of los 
Angeles. 22 Cal. 3d 792 ( 1978) and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 
207 Cal. App. 3d 566 ( 1989). The District’s practice of 
including brief invocations and benedictions does not exhibit a 
preference for religion because the District is willing to 
recognize representatives of various religions in its ceremonies.
The District’s practice is also permissible'under article 
XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution. The relevant part 
of this section prohibits the District from granting anything in 
aid of religious purposes, including "any official involvement, 
whatever its form, which has the direct, immediate, and 
substantial effect of promoting religious purposes." California 
Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.l2 
(1974). The District’s practice is constitutional because any 
aid to religion which results from the inclusion of brief 
invocations and benedictions in otherwise wholly secular 
ceremonies neither directly nor substantially promotes religion, 
nor does it implicate the District’s authority or prestige in aid 
of religious purposes.
Finally, the District’s practice is permissible under 
article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution because no
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direct or indirect teaching of sectarian or denominational 
doctrine occurs. Cal. Const, art. IX, § 8. "Teach" is defined 
as meaning "to conduct through a course of studies" or "to 
present in a classroom lecture or discussion." Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 2346 (1986). The unique 
circumstances of the graduation ceremonies show that no teaching 
is intended and none occurs.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT’S PRACTICE OF INCLUDING BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND 
BENEDICTIONS AT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONIES IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE ABSOLUTE 
SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE ACTIVITIES.
The District’s practice is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s policy of accommodation and neutrality toward
issues affecting both church and state. The Court has
consistently declined to interpret the words of the Establishment
Clause to require an absolute wall of separation between church
and state activities. While the Establishment Clause does
'*forbid[] an established church or anything approaching it,"
Lynch. 465 U.S, at 673. the Court has never thought it either
"possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation .
..." Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
NvQuist. 413 U.S. 756. 760 (1973).
Rather, the words, "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion," U.S. Const, amend. I, have been 
construed as "affirmatively mandat[ing] accommodation, not merely 
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."
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Lynch. 465 U.S. at 673. The government, therefore, is to be 
neutral, while "respect[ing] the religious nature of our people 
and accommodat [ ing ] the public service to their spiritual needs. 
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). To require anything 
less would lead to a "callous indifference" toward religion that 
was never intended by the Establishment Clause.
Petitioners allege that the District’s practice of including 
brief invocations and benedictions at its high school graduation 
ceremonies violates the Establishment Clause of the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment. To determine the 
constitutionality of such challenges to the Establishment Clause, 
the Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. To be constitutionally valid according 
to Lemon. a practice must: 1) have a secular rather than 
religious purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; and 3) not lead to excessive governmental 
involvement. Id^ at 612-13. The Lemon test has been applied in 
the majority of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically 
addressed the constitutionality of invocations and benedictions 
at public high school graduation ceremonies. Two California 
appellate decisions, Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d 45, and Bennett v^. 
Livermore Unified School Dist.. 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012 (1987), 
each applied Lemon with different results. However, the Sands 
analysis, finding the challenged practice constitutional, is
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consistent with other Supreme Court decisions applying the 
guidelines enumerated in Lemon»
A. Brief Invocations and Benedictions at High School
Graduation Ceremonies Are Constitutional Because Their
Primary Purpose Is Secular* Not Religious*
The Court has determined that invocations serve the 
"legitimate secular purposel] of solemnizing public occasions." 
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, 
a practice need not serve an exclusively secular purpose to be 
constitutional under the purpose prong of Lemon. Lynch. 465 U.S. 
at 681 n.6. Rather, a court will invalidate a practice on the 
ground that the practice lacks a secular purpose only when it 
concludes that the activity was motivated wholly by religious 
considerations. Id. at 680. Although Petitioners allege that 
the District’s invocations and benedictions are religious by 
nature, the practice is nonetheless constitutional because the 
District’s purpose for maintaining it is legitimately secular.
The Court examines the religious character of an activity 
in the context of the government’s purpose for promulgating it. 
See School Dist. of Abington Township. Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38 (1985); and Stone v. 
Graham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). Exclusive focus by a court on the 
religious nature of a practice without consideration of its 
context is clear error. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. Thus, the Sands 
court correctly refuted the Bennett court’s finding that, because 
an invocation is a "religious activity in itself,” it does not 
pass the purpose prong of Lemon. Bennett. 193 Cal. App. 3d at
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1020 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 43 n.22 and jCaren B. v. Treen, 
653 F.2d. 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981)). The proper inquiry is "not 
whether the challenged conduct is religious in nature, but 
whether the religious activity is being used for a secular 
purpose . . . Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d at 57 (citing Lyn^,
465 U.S. at 681 n.6).
In Lynch, the city owned all the components of a retail 
merchants’ Christmas display, including a creche. The Court 
conceded that the creche was a Christian religious symbol. 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the district court erred in 
focusing almost exclusively on the creche in its determination 
that the city had no secular purpose for the display. Lynch, 465 
U.S. at 680. Instead, the Supreme Court accepted the city’s 
claim that its purpose for including the creche in the display 
was to "depict[] the historical origins of this traditional event 
long recognized as a National Holiday." Id^ The Court concluded 
that, in the context of the Christmas season, and in a display of 
wholly secular holiday symbols such as Christmas trees and 
reindeer, there was "insufficient evidence to establish that the 
inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort 
to express . . . subtle governmental advocacy of a particular
religious message.” Id, at 680.
The practice in the present case, like that in Lynch,
withstands the purpose prong of the bemon analysis when 
appropriately scrutinized in its contextual setting. The 
invocations and benedictions comprise only a fraction of an
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otherwise wholly secular ceremony, just as the creche in Lynch is 
only one component in a display of numerous secular holiday 
symbols. The invocations and benedictions last only thirty to 
sixty seconds in a ceremony that runs from forty-five to ninety 
minutes. They are only two of a total of twenty-one elements 
that make up the graduation ceremony. Inclusion of other 
ceremonial elements such as the pledge of allegiance, the 
national anthem, the processional, and the recessional, clearly 
indicates that the District’s purpose is ceremonial. When 
examined under the Lynch contextual analysis, there is no 
evidence that the District’s inclusion of invocations and 
benedictions at its graduation ceremonies is a purposeful effort 
to express advocacy for a particular religious message. The 
practice serves a legitimate secular interest and is therefore 
constitutional under the purpose prong of the temon test.
B. The Inclusion of Brief Invocations and Benedictions at 
the District’s High School Graduation Ceremonies Is 
Constitutional Because it Does Not Have the Effect of 
Endorsing Rel igioHj,
The Court has not arrived at a concise definition of what 
constitutes the advancement or inhibition of religion under the 
second prong of Lemon. However, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
in Lynch set forth the most definitive analysis to date. "The 
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual 
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (0 Connor, 
J., concurring). As part of an endorsement analysis, the Court
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considers whether a challenged practice only incidentally and 
remotely benefits religion. Where this is the case» a practice 
does not have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. Id. 
at 683; County of Allegheny. 109 S. Ct. at 3092.
In Lynch. Justice O’Connor concurred with the majority that 
the city’s inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because the practice was not 
understood by the public to be a governmental endorsement of the 
religious aspect of the holiday. Lynch. 465 U.S. at 692. The 
Lynch endorsement analysis was followed in County of Allegheny, 
where the Court upheld a county’s practice of placing a menorah 
next to a Christmas tree during the holiday season. County of 
Allegheny. 109 S. Ct. 3086. Lynch also applied endorsement 
language to reaffirm other decisions made prior to Lemon in which 
the Court upheld practices challenged under the Establishment 
Clause, such as Everson v. Bd. of Educ. . 330 U.S. 1 ( 1947 )
(public funding for busing children to church-sponsored schools), 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n. 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for 
church properties), and Zorach. 343 U.S. 306 (released-time 
programs for religious training of public school children).
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 682.
Application of the foregoing analysis to the facts in the 
case at bar compels the same result reached by the court below, 
"that the religious effect of the invocation[s] and 
benediction!s] is remote and incidental." Sands. 214 Cal. App.
3d at 59. Invocations are as much an accepted part of public
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ceremonies as creches are an accepted part of Christmas holiday 
displays. The District’s practice, like the practice in Lyncji, 
is not generally perceived by the public as a governmental 
endorsement of religion. Any beneficial effect the District’s 
practice has on religion is certainly more remote than the effect 
of the roenorah in Countv of Allegheny or the effect of the 
figurine of the Christ child in Lynchi both of which were 
displayed throughout the holiday season. Likewise, any 
beneficial effect the District’s practice has on religion is far 
more remote than the effects of the practices of public funding 
to private schools, tax exemptions, and religious training upheld 
in prior decisions. Therefore, any incidental benefit to 
religion the District's ceremonial practice may confer does not 
constitute an endorsement of religion and is not sufficient to 
render the practice invalid under the Establishment Clause.
C. Invocations and Benedictions at the District.’s
Graduation Ceremonies Are Const_itutional Because the 
Practice Requires Little State Surveillance and No 
Funding.
The District’s practice is constitutional under the third 
prong of Lemon because it does not involve supervision or funding 
sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement with any 
religious institution. Entanglement is a question of kind and 
degree. Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 684. To determine whether the 
government’s entanglement with religion is excessive, the Court 
examines: 1) the character and purpose of the benefited
institution; 2) the nature of the state aid provided; and 3) the
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resulting relationship between government and the religious 
authority. Lemon. 403 U.S. at 615. A practice which requires 
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance" amounts to excessive entanglement between church 
and state. Id. at 619. No state surveillance or funding of the 
type or degree evidenced in Lemon is found in the case at bar.
In Lemon, a Pennsylvania statute which provided for state 
aid to private schools in the form of subsidized teachers’ 
salaries, student text books, and instructional materials in 
specified secular subjects, failed the excessive entanglement 
test. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. In the same decision, the Court also 
held that a Rhode Island statute under which the state 
supplemented fifteen percent of private elementary school 
teachers’ annual salaries was invalid due to excessive 
entanglement between the state and sectarian schools. Id.
The Lemon Court based its decision on the following findings 
of fart: the majority of schools benefited were church- 
affiliated; the monetary form of aid was allocated to schools or 
to teachers in schools whose purpose was largely to inculcate 
impressionable elementary school students with religious 
doctrine; and both statutes provided for careful surveillance by 
state authorities to ensure that the state aid supported only 
secular education. Id. at 619, 621. The "intimate and 
continuing relationship between church and state" necessary to 
ensure the state aid supported only secular education was found 
excessive and therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment
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Clause. Id. at 622.
Applying the excessive entanglement analysis formulated in 
Lemon to the case at bar shows that the District's practice has 
none of the elements of "comprehensive* discriminating* and 
continuing” entanglement the court found excessive in Lemon. Id. 
at 619. First, the practice benefits no identifiable religious 
institution. The speakers are either clergy persons from 
different denominations, or lay persons. The language of the 
invocations and benedictions is nonsectarian and the ceremonies 
at which they are delivered take place at the high schools, not 
at any church-affiliated establishment.
Second, the District provides no aid, monetary or otherwise, 
to the speakers or to their affiliate churches. The clergy 
persons speak voluntarily. No district funds are allocated for 
the purpose of providing invocations and benedictions or to 
supervise the activity.
Third, the District does not have any ongoing contact with 
any religious institution concerning the invocations and 
benedictions. The only contact the District has with any 
religious institution is when, once a year* the school official 
calls the speaker whom the students have selected and invites him 
or her to speak. No other contact between the District and any 
religious institution is necessary, nor does it occur.
As the Sands court correctly concluded, the District’s 
practice of including invocations and benedictions at its high 
school graduation ceremonies "will not foster excessive
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entanglement." and is therefore constitutional under the third 
prong of Lemon. Sands. 214 Cal* App. 3d at 60.
II. BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER OTHER ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT.
Although the Lemon test has been applied to the majority of 
Establishment Clause cases, the Court has been "unwilling[] to be 
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." 
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 679. One alternative test was developed in 
Lynch. 465 U.S. 668, and County of Allegheny. 109 S. Ct, 3086. 
While Lynch examined whether the challenged practice withstood a 
Lemon analysis, the focus of the Lynch court»s inquiry was on the 
creche in the context of the holiday season, and whether, given 
that context, the practice constituted the establishment of 
religion. Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 679. County of Allegheny, 
following Lynch. dispensed with a Lemon analysis and applied the 
contextual test exclusively in determining whether the practice 
endorsed religion. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086. We 
have already shown that the District’s practice withstands the 
contextual test in our discussion of the purpose prong of Lemon.
Another test was set forth by the Court in Marsh v^
Chambers. 463 U.S. 783, a case directly analogous to the one at 
bar. The Court did not "consider [a Demon] analysis relevant in 
deciding whether legislative invocations were constitutionally 
permissible under the Establishment Clause. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
679. Rather, the Court applied an historical analysis, reasoning 
that invocations have historically been accepted by our
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government as serving a permissible ceremonial function. The 
First Congress adopted the practice of opening legislative 
sessions with invocations as early as 1789. Marsh. 463 U.S. at 
788. Many members of that congressional body were participants 
in the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Id. 
at 790. While historical patterns alone do not justify 
constitutional violations, the historical context in which 
legislative invocations were adopted "sheds light not only on 
what the drafters . . . intended the Establishment Clause to mean
but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice 
[of legislative invocations]." Id. at 783.
The Marsh court thus upheld the Nebraska state legislature’s 
100 year practice of opening each session with a prayer delivered 
by a chaplain, finding that it did not constitute an endorsement 
of religion. The Court reasoned that it would be "incongruous to 
interpret that Clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment 
limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal 
Government." Id. at 790-91.
It would likewise be incongruous to interpret the 
Establishment Clause as imposing a stricter standard on a 
government body such as the Morongo Unified School District, 
operating under the auspices of the state government, than the 
standard imposed on the state and federal goverments.
Petitioners argue that the Marsh decision only narrowly applies 
to legislative invocations. However, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Lynch. which likened the legitimate secular
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purpose of legislative invocations to courtroom invocations, 
suggests that the Marsh decision may be interpreted to validate 
invocations in general. Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).
The District’s practice, therefore, withstands scrutiny 
under other Establishment Clause tests set out by the Court.
Even if this court found the practice invalid under any prong of 
the Lemon test, it is nonetheless valid under the equally 
legitimate contextual and historical tests.
III. BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES 
are NOT ANALOGOUS TO SCHOOL PRAYER CASES BECAUSE THEY ARE 
NOT REPETITIVE, THEY OCCUR OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM SETTING,
AND PARENTS ARE PRESENT TO SUPERVISE,
The stricter standard the courts usually employ for
monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in the school
setting is not applicable to the issue of including invocations
and benedictions in high school graduation ceremonies. The
District recognizes that the courts are particularly vigilant
about Establishment Clause cases involving schools due to the
impressionable age of the recipients and the lack of parental
supervision and parental ability to intervene against practices
which contradict the family’s beliefs. Edwards vl*—Aguillard, 482
V U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987). The District’s practice, however, is
more appropriately scrutinized under an analysis of permissible
ceremonial practices than under a school prayer analysis.
The Court has invalidated school prayer policies which
compel public school children to affirmatively comply with
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repetitive, pedagogical religious practices, because they have 
the effect of endorsing religion and lack any clearly secular 
purpose. See Wallace» 472 U.S. 38; Abington, 374 U.S. 203;
Engel. 370 U.S. 421. Invocations, on the other hand, have been 
interpreted as a form of governmental acknowledgement of religion 
that serves "the legitimate secular purpose[] of solemnizing 
public occasions." Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).
Unlike the school prayers struck down in Wallace, Abipgton, 
and Engel. the District’s practice of including invocations and 
benedictions is not an affirmative religious activity mandated by 
the District to be performed daily. It contains no repetitive or 
pedagogical function that characterizes school prayer cases, nor 
any element of calculated indoctrination. The ceremonies are a 
once a year occurrence, once in a lifetime for most graduates.
The District does not write the text nor mandate that the 
speakers represent any particular sect. Rather, the District 
requests that the speakers include only nonsectarian language, 
which is consistent with the Mar^ decision. Attendees at the 
ceremonies are not required to recite the invocations or
benedictions, nor to respond to them.
Even the Supreme Court has distinguished between official 
public school prayers promulgated in cases such as Engel., 370 
U.S. 421, and "patriotic or ceremonial" practices in which school 
children and others are officially encouraged to recite anthems 
or read historical documents such as the Declaration of
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Independence I which contain references to faith in a deity. Id.
at 435 n.21. "Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no 
true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the 
State of New York has sponsored in rEngel 1. " Id.
Additional support for interpreting invocations and 
benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies as 
distinguishable from other school prayer cases is found in many 
federal appellate and district court decisions on point. See 
Stein V. Plainwell Community Schools. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 
1987); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist._. 342 F. Supp.
1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); and Grossberg v. Deusebio. 380 F. Supp, 285 
(E.D. Va. 1974). As the Stein court reasoned, "annual graduation 
exercises . . • are analogous to the legislative and judicial
sessions referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same 
principles!,]" even though a school function is involved. St_ein, 
822 F.2d at 1409.
The lower courts based their decisions on facts directly 
analogous to the facts in the case at bar. Many students in the 
District’s high school graduation ceremonies have achieved 
adulthood, so their impressionability is not a significant 
concern for the court. Additionally, the ceremonies take place 
after school hours in non-classroom settings, in the presence of 
the students’ parents. Thus, the court’s usual concerns for the 
inculcating effect of the teacher-student relationship and lack 
of parental supervision are also not relevant considerations in 
evaluating the effect of invocations and benedictions in the high
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school graduation context. The District's practice bears none of 
the characteristics found invalid in school prayer cases and 
should be governed by the principles used to determine legitimate 
ceremonial practices«
IV. THE PRACTICE OF INCLUDING BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS 
at graduation CEREMONIES IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 4 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT A 
LAW RESPECTING ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND IT DOES NOT 
EXHIBIT A PREFERENCE FOR RELIGION.
Although we have demonstrated that the District’s inclusion 
of brief invocations and benedictions is valid under the United 
States Constitution’s Establishment Clause, a further examination 
of the challenged practice is necessary to show that it is valid 
under the Establishment and No Preference Clauses of the 
California Constitution. Cal. Const, art. I, § 4. This 
additional analysis is compelled by article I» section 24 of the 
California Constitution which states that "[rlights guaranteed by 
this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution." Cal. Const, art. I, § 24.
Through article I, section 4, the California Constitution 
provides somewhat greater protection than does the United States 
Constitution because it not only proscribes all laws respecting 
establishment of religion, but also guarantees that there will be 
no preference for one religion over another. F^, 22 Cal. 3d at 
796. "By its express terms, what [article I, section 4] mandates 
is the perpetual guaranty of the *[f]ree exercise and enjoyment’ 
of religion; what it prohibits is 'discrimination* against, *or 
preference’ in favor of, one religion as opposed to another.”
24
Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596| 617 (1976).
The District’s inclusion of brief invocations and 
benedictions at its graduation ceremonies does not violate the 
United States Constitution’s Establishment Clause and an analysis 
of the parallel provision of the California Constitution compels 
the same result. Because there are few California cases which 
explore in detail the Establishment Clause of the state s 
constitution, California courts have "consult[ed] principles of 
federal cases as they seem compelling guides to uncharted state 
grounds," Feminist Women’s Health Center_v_t—Phijibosi^, 157 
Cal. App. 3d 1076, 1086 (1984). Accordingly, the analysis 
developed above, which examined federal cases to conclude that 
the challenged practice is permissible under the federal 
Establishment Clause, is also appropriate for an analysis of the 
Establishment Clause of article I, section 4 of the California 
Constitution.
A separate analysis is required to address the No Preference 
Clause of the California Constitution. Even under this arguably 
more stringent provision prohibiting a preference for one 
religion over another, the District’s practice withstands 
scrutiny. The preference test as established in £ox, 22 Cal. 3d 
792, and developed in Okrand. 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, is applied in 
determining whether a "governmental action exhibits a preference 
for a religion or a religious belief." Okrand, 207 Cal. App. 3d 
at 579 (citing Fox. 22 Cal. 3d at 796).
The California Supreme Court has not yet applied the
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preference test to a case with facts similar to those in the
present case. However, the reasoning used by the court in Okrand 
is analogous to the situation here. The court applied the 
preference test in Okrand and upheld as constitutional the city 
hall’s holiday display of a menorah. Id. at 579. The court 
indicated that while the menorah is central to the celebration of 
Chanukah, it "does not readily focus attention on a religious 
doctrine . . . ." Id. at 580. Furthermore, the display "showed
no more preference for Judaism than display of the Christmas tree 
showed for Christianity." Id. at 579.
The city’s willingness to display a variety of religious 
symbols supports the Okrand court’s conclusion that no preference 
was exhibited. The menorah was displayed together with other 
religious symbols. Id. In Fox, the court found unconstitutional 
the illumination of a Latin cross in the windows of the city hall 
tower because it was "preferential when comparable recognition of 
other religious symbols [was] impracticable." Fox. 22 Cal. 3d at 
797. The impracticability which troubled the court in Fox was 
absent in Okrand.
The analysis used by the Okrand court compels a similar 
result in the case at bar. Application of the preference test to 
the case at bar shows that the District does not exhibit a 
preference for religion by including brief invocations and 
benedictions at its high school graduation ceremonies. As was 
the city in Okrand. the District is willing to recognize various 
religions. Although historically the invocations and
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benedictions have been delivered by clergy from Christian faiths, 
the students* participation in selection of speakers allows for 
speakers who represent no religion or those who represent 
different religions.
The California Constitution does not require that every 
religion be represented in every situation. Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 
797. The fact that the Christian religion has been the 
predominant religion among the speakers chosen for the graduation 
ceremonies does not indicate a preference for the Christian 
religion. Rather, it reflects the choice freely exercised by the
District’s graduating students.
The District does not have a policy requiring the speakers 
to be clergy persons, nor does it determine the content of the 
invocations or benedictions. Both Twenty-Nine Palms and Yucca 
Valley allow graduating seniors to select the speakers for the 
graduation ceremonies. At Twenty-Nine Palms, a student selection 
committee chooses the speakers and makes the final selection. At 
Yucca Valley, the vice principal assists the senior class 
president in making the choice, and the principal has the right 
of final selection. While a school official intervened and 
requested that a member of the clergy be chosen for the 
invocation at Yucca Valley in 1986, this request was made 
specifically to maintain the status quo following the initiation 
of this litigation. The students complied with the request and
selected a pastor to deliver the invocation.
One exhibits a preference when one selects someone or
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something over another or others." American Heritage Dictionary 
1033 ( 1979). In the case at bar, there is no evidence that any 
religious group seeking to deliver an invocation or benediction 
has ever been denied its request. Where no one has been denied 
the opportunity to speak, a preference has not been exercised. 
There is no indication in the record that the District would 
prohibit a speaker chosen by the students because he or she might 
not represent any religious group or might represent a religion 
practiced by only a minority of the students.
Consideration of the above factors supports a determination 
that the District has not exhibited a preference for religion.
The District is only minimally involved in the speaker selection 
process. It has no policies regarding who shall be selected nor 
what the content of the invocations and benedictions shall be.
The District has not denied speaker status to representatives of 
any particular religion, nor is there evidence that it would if 
such a request were made. When evaluated under the preference 
test, it is clear that the District has not exhibited a 
preference in violation of article I, section 4 of the California 
Constitution.
V. THE INCLUSION OF BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT 
GRADUATION CEREMONIES IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XVI, 
SECTION 5 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THE 
DISTRICT DOES NOT GRANT ANYTHING IN AID OF A RELIGIOUS 
PURPOSE.
The District’s inclusion of invocations and benedictions at 
high school graduation ceremonies complies with the stringent 
requirements of Article XVI, section 5 of the California
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Constitution. The relevant portion of article XVI, section 5 
reads, "iNjeither the Legislature, nor any . . . school district 
. . • shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public 
fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious 
sect ... or sectarian purpose . . . ." Cal. Const, art. XVI, § 
5. The inclusion of brief invocations and benedictions is 
permissible because: 1) no District funds are spent in order to 
include them in the graduation ceremonies, and 2) while the 
District’s involvement in the ceremonies may be official, it does 
not directly or substantially promote any religious purpose and 
it does not implicate the District’s authority. Consequently, 
the District’s historical and traditional practice meets the 
standards set forth by article XVI, section 5.
The California Supreme Court developed a test for courts to 
apply in determining the effect on religion, and thus the 
constitutionality of a state activity challenged as violating 
article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution. The court 
interpreted article XVI, section 5 to "bani] any official 
involvement, whatever its form, which has the direct, immediate, 
and substantial effect of promoting religious purposes." Priest. 
12 Cal. 3d at 605 n.l2. The statute challenged in Priest 
provided private institutions of higher education with financial 
assistance to build new facilities. Priest. 12 Cal. 3d at 596. 
The court in Priest determined that the challenged statute did 
not violate article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution 
because it did not have "a substantial effect of supporting
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Id. at 606. The court added furtherreligious activities, 
definition to the Priest test in Fox v. City of Los Angeles. In 
Fox. the court interpreted article XVI, section 5 to forbid "all 
forms of governmental aid to religion, whether that aid be in the 
tangible form of cash or in the intangible form of prestige and 
power." Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 802 (Bird, C.J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
The California Supreme Court has not yet applied article 
XVI, section 5 to a situation factually similar to the one before 
the court today. However, the test developed in Pries.t and F^ 
consistently has been applied to cases where a practice is 
challenged as violating article XVI, section 5. Application of 
the test to the facts in the present case will show that the 
District's inclusion of invocations and benedictions is
constitutionally permissible.
First, the District’s practice complies with article XVI, 
section 5 because no public funds are appropriated for the 
inclusion of the invocations and benedictions in the graduation 
ceremonies. The costs attributable to the graduation budget are 
spent on faculty cap and gown rental, program printing costs, and 
security. All the funds the District spent would have been spent 
regardless of whether invocations and benedictions were included 
in the graduation ceremonies. In addition, the speakers at the 
ceremonies volunteer their time. As a result, the District does 
not appropriate funds in violation of article XVI, section 5 of 
the California Constitution.
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Second, application of the test from Priest and Fox to the 
case at bar shows that the invocations and benedictions do not 
have the substantial or direct effect of promoting religious 
purposes, nor do they provide intangible aid by enlisting the 
District’s authority or prestige. Article XVI, section 5 does 
not require governmental hostility toward religion. Priest. 12 
Cal. 3d at 605. Any aid to a religious purpose which may result 
from inclusion of the invocations and benedictions is at most 
indirect and insubstantial. The graduation ceremonies are 
school-sponsored and therefore the District’s involvement may be 
characterized as official. However, many characteristics of the 
graduation ceremonies combine to render any aid to a religious 
purpose insubstantial. The ceremonies last from forty-five to 
ninety minutes. In contrast, the invocations and benedictions 
last from thirty to sixty seconds. The latter are included for 
the secular purpose of establishing a solemn and formal tone for 
the proceedings. Moreover, the language of the invocations and 
benedictions is nonsectarian.
Furthermore, the District’s authority and prestige are not 
implicated directly or indirectly for several reasons. The 
District plays a limited role in selection of the speakers and 
does not review the content of the invocations and benedictions. 
The fact that speakers are not compensated lends further support 
to a determination that the District’s authority and prestige are 
not implicated. Additionally, the brevity of the invocations and 
benedictions and their inclusion in an otherwise secular context
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make it highly unlikely that anyone in the audience will perceive 
the District to have aligned itself with a religious purpose. 
Because the District does not place its authority or prestige 
behind the invocations and benedictions, and it is not perceived 
as doing so, the inclusion of the invocations and benedictions is 
permissible under article XVI, section 5 of the California 
Constitution.
VI. BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES 
ARE PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE IX, SECTION 8 OF THE 
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY NEITHER DIRECTLY NOR 
INDIRECTLY TEACH A SECTARIAN DOCTRINE.
The District’s practice is constitutionally permissible when 
analyzed according to article IX, section 8 of the California 
Constitution. Article IX, section 8 provides, '*[n]o public money 
shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or 
denominational school . . . nor shall any sectarian or
denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction thereon be 
permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools 
of this State." Cal. Const, art. IX, § 8. The relevant portion 
of the section prohibits the teaching or instruction of religious 
doctrine in public schools.
The facts in the case at bar compel the conclusion that the 
District’s practice of including invocations and benedictions is 
permissible under article IX, section 8 because it is not a 
teaching of sectarian or denominational doctrine. "Teach" means 
"to conduct through a course of studies" or "to present in a 
classroom lecture or discussion." Webster’s Third New
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International Dictionary 2346 (1986). The speakers delivering 
the invocations and benedictions are not teaching, but are simply 
welcoming the students to the events through the invocations and 
wishing them well at the conclusion of the events through the 
benedictions.
Examination of the circumstances surrounding the graduation 
ceremonies further illustrates that no teaching has occurred.
The invocations and benedictions are not delivered during regular 
school hours when attendance is compulsory, but after school 
hours at only one time in each student’s academic career. 
Moreover, the graduation ceremonies do not take place in the 
classroom, the usual venue for instruction. At Yucca Valley, for 
example, the graduation takes place on the football field. Most 
of the students attend with their families. The potential for 
unwanted instruction is nullified by the presence and supervision 
of these families, with whom the students presumably share any 
religious beliefs they may hold. The delivery of brief 
invocations and benedictions, lasting only thirty to sixty 
seconds, simply cannot be viewed as teaching in the ordinary 
sense of the word. Neither the families, the faculty, nor the 
students expects instruction, and they do not receive it.
It should be noted that the lower court’s reliance on the 
Priest court’s application of article IX, section 8 was 
misplaced. The Priest decision concerned article IX, section 8 
as it applies to sectarian schools. The court there determined 
that no public money had been spent in support of a sectarian
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school in violation of article IX, section 8. Sands, 214 Cal.
App. 3d at 61-62. The Sands court analogized directly to the 
Priest decision and applied the same part of article IX, section 
8. Because there is no sectarian school involved in the case at 
bar, as there was in Priest. the lower court’s application of 
this provision as used in Priest was misplaced. However, the 
lower court’s mistake was harmless error, because as 
demonstrated, the facts withstand scrutiny under the relevant 
part of the provision. The District’s inclusion of invocations 
and benedictions in the graduation ceremonies does not constitute 
direct or indirect teaching of denominational doctrine in the 
schools and therefore does not violate article IX, section 8 of 
the California Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The District’s practice of including brief invocations and 
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is 
constitutional under the federal Establishment Clause because:
1) its purpose is sufficiently secular when viewed in its 
ceremonial context; 2) it does not have the effect of endorsing 
religion and any promotional effect it has on religion is at most 
incidental and remote; and 3) no supervision or funding 
sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement with a religious 
institution is involved in the practice. The practice is also 
constitutional as a permissible ceremonial religious function.
Furthermore, the District’s practice of including 
invocations and benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies
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is permissible under the California Constitution. The District 
does not exhibit a preference for religion. It does not spend 
any funds to support the inclusion of invocations and 
benedictions, nor does it promote, or appear to implicate its 
authority in support of, any religious purpose. Finally, 
delivery of the invocations and benedictions does not teach a 
sectarian doctrine.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents pray this court to 
affirm the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and to 
hold that the District's practice of including invocations and 
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the United 
States Constitution and under article I, section 4; article XVI, 
section 5; and article IX, section 8 of the California 
Constitution.
Dated: October 25, 1990
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